A Strengthened Mechanism, Yet Still a Source of Debate

Lists of non-cooperative tax havens are today one of the primary instruments in the fight against fraud, tax evasion, and harmful tax practices. Since their creation, they have evolved considerably, driven by the European Union, the OECD, and the G20.

However, despite shared objectives of transparency and international cooperation, the criteria used by these different organizations remain distinct.

This diversity contributes to a degree of confusion regarding which territories can genuinely be described as “tax havens.”

Different Criteria Depending on the International Organization

The European Union updates its blacklist of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions twice a year. This list is based on three main criteria:

• tax transparency;
• fair taxation;
• implementation of the international standards developed by the OECD to combat base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).

Following the February 2026 revision, the EU list includes ten jurisdictions: American Samoa, Anguilla, Guam, Palau, Panama, Russia, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

This list is regularly updated based on the commitments made by the jurisdictions concerned.

The OECD, for its part, favors an approach based on international cooperation, tax transparency, and the application of the standards set by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. Its aim is more to guide jurisdictions toward compliance than to establish a list of “tax havens.”

Finally, several non-governmental organizations, notably Oxfam, publish their own lists using much broader criteria, including low levels of taxation, preferential tax regimes, and multinational companies’ international tax optimization practices.

A Methodology That Continues to Draw Criticism

Differences in methodology explain why the same jurisdiction can be absent from one list while appearing on another.

The States concerned regularly challenge their inclusion, arguing that certain criteria remain subjective or are applied unevenly. Conversely, several NGOs and academics consider that the official lists remain incomplete and do not fully reflect current international tax optimization mechanisms.

This divergence undermines the clarity of the system and its credibility among economic stakeholders.

The Persistent Limitations of the European List

The main limitation of the European list remains unchanged: it applies only to jurisdictions located outside the European Union.

Yet several member states are regularly criticized over certain tax regimes that are particularly attractive to multinational groups. Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Cyprus are frequently cited in academic research, NGO reports, and certain European Commission analyses as offering arrangements that facilitate international tax optimization.

These states, however, cannot appear on the European list, since it is intended exclusively for third countries. This particularity regularly fuels criticism of the system’s coherence.

The Special Case of the United States

The United States also occupies a distinctive position within the international tax transparency system.

It applies the FATCA framework, which requires foreign financial institutions to report information concerning American taxpayers. However, it still does not participate in the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) developed by the OECD for the multilateral automatic exchange of tax information.

Furthermore, certain U.S. states continue to be regularly identified as offering a high level of confidentiality for certain legal structures, which fuels ongoing debate about their role in international tax optimization strategies.

New Challenges in International Taxation

Since 2021, the international tax landscape has changed profoundly with the progressive implementation of the 15% global minimum tax applicable to large multinational groups (Pillar Two of the OECD/G20 agreement).

This major reform does not, however, call into question the usefulness of lists of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which remain a complementary tool aimed at promoting tax transparency and combating harmful tax regimes.

A Useful but Imperfect Instrument

Blacklists today serve as an effective form of diplomatic pressure to encourage certain jurisdictions to strengthen their tax cooperation. Numerous delistings demonstrate their incentive effect.

Nevertheless, their effectiveness remains debated. The major international financial centers, along with certain states engaging in aggressive tax competition, still largely escape these mechanisms.

More than a true map of tax havens, these lists appear to be an instrument of international tax governance whose scope depends closely on the criteria chosen and the political will of the states that establish them.